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Abstract. The vulnerability of Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) to ad-
versarial attacks has led to development of many defense approaches.
Among them, Adversarial Training (AT) is a popular and widely used
approach for training adversarially robust models. Mixup Training (MT),
a recent popular training algorithm, improves generalization performance
of models by introducing globally linear behavior in between training ex-
amples. Although still in its early phase, we observe a shift in trend of
exploiting Mixup from perspectives of generalisation to that of adversar-
ial robustness. It has been shown that the Mixup trained models improves
robustness of models but only passively. A recent approach, Mixup Infer-
ence (MI), proposes an inference principle for Mixup trained models to
counter adversarial examples at inference time by mixing the input with
other random clean samples. In this work, we propose a new approach -
VarMixup (Variational Mixup) - to better sample mixup images by using
the latent manifold underlying the data. Our experiments on CIFAR-
10, CIFAR-100, SVHN and Tiny-Imagenet demonstrate that VarMixup
beats state-of-the-art AT techniques without training the model adver-
sarially. Additionally, we also conduct ablations that show that models
trained on VarMixup samples are also robust to various input corrup-
tions/perturbations, have low calibration error and are transferable.
Keywords: Adversarial Robustness, Mixup, Mixup Inference
1 Introduction
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have become a key ingredient to solve many chal-
lenging tasks like classification, segmentation, object detection, speech recogni-
tion, etc. However, it is now known that they can be fooled by applying im-
perceptible perturbations, called adversarial perturbations, to input examples
leading to wrong predictions[41,14]. Over the past few years, various approaches
[47,21,1,8,27,14,49,30,29] have been proposed to craft adversarial examples by
maximizing the network’s prediction error in distinct ways. As a consequence, it
has become quite risky to deploy them in safety-critical applications including
autonomous navigation or healthcare. Efforts [27,14,36,38,55,35,31,12,44] have
been made in recent years to make models robust to these adversarial perturba-
tions. Among the proposed methods, Adversarial Training (AT) [38,27,14,56,25]
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has emerged as a popular and widely uses algorithm to obtain adversarially ro-
bust models. Several variants of adversarial training have been proposed lately
with motivation of inducing local linearity [35] by training networks using adver-
sarial examples. However, training robust models using AT is not only computa-
tionally expensive but suffers from a performance degradation on clean examples
[43]. Though some recent attempts [37,53] have managed to adversarially train
models in a low computational budget, they still suffer from the trade-off between
standard accuracy and robustness to adversarial perturbations.
On the other hand, Mixup Training (MT) [57] has emerged as a popular
technique to train models having both better generalisation and robustness.
However, robustness performance of Mixup trained models is significantly lower
than AT techniques [25,27] when it comes to strong adversarial attacks like PGD
[27], structural [49] or functional attacks. Taking advantage of the induced global
linearity in between training examples by MT, Pang et al. [33] proposed Mixup
Inference (MI) to exploit this global linearity at inference time and better defend
Mixup-trained models against adversarial attacks. Though MI has been shown
to significantly boost adversarial robustness of Mixup-trained models, the per-
formance outperforms AT only when applied on top of Interpolated Adversarial
Training [25], which is yet another adversarial training technique.
Although still in its early phase, the above efforts [57,46,33] indicate a trend
to viewing Mixup from a robustness perspective.
Fig. 1: Performance of Mixup Train-
ing (MT) [57] , Mixup-Inference
(MI) [33], Adversarial training (AT)
[27], TRADES [56], LAT [38], IAT
[25] and VarMixup (ours)
In this work, we take another step in
this direction and propose a sampling
technique called VarMixup (Variational
Mixup) to sample better Mixup images
during training and inference to induce
adversarial robustness. In particular, we
hypothesize that the latent unfolded man-
ifold underlying the data (through a gen-
erative model, a Varaitional Autoencoder
in our case) is linear by construction,
and hence more suitable for the linear in-
terpolations used in Mixup. Importantly,
we show that this choice of the dis-
tribution for Mixup plays an important
role towards adversarial robustness (Sec-
tion 3). Our experiments on 4 standard
datasets- CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, SVHN,
Tiny-Imagenet shows that VarMixup when combined with Mixup training and
inference, beats state-of the art adversarial training techniques (like PGD [27]
and IAT [25]) under oblivious attacks without training model adversarially.
We conduct several other studies to examine the proposed method, and obtain
promising results across all these experiments.
Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
– We propose a new sampling technique, VarMixup, which when combined
with Mixup training and inference, outperforms adversarial training (by 5-
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10%) techniques without training the model in adversarial fashion. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first sampling technique explicitly pro-
posed for adversarial robustness, and also the first among Mixup methods
to consider the latent unfolded manifold for interpolation.
– Additionally, we show that models trained using VarMixup samples are ro-
bust to common corruptions and perturbations, have low calibration error
and are transferable.
– We also conduct a comprehensive set of studies which show that VarMixup
significantly decreases the local linearity error of the neural network and
generates samples that are slightly off-distribution from training examples
or mixup generated samples, to provide robustness.
2 Related Work
We briefly discuss earlier efforts in adversarial attacks and defenses, as well as
Mixup-based methods, that are closest to this work.
Adversarial Attacks and Defenses Adversarial Attacks can be mainly clas-
sified into three categories: White-box attacks [30,27,47,14], Black-box attacks
[21,1,34,8] and Oblivious attacks [9]. In the white-box setting, the adversary has
full access to the network; and in the black-box setting, the adversary has no
information about the network. Oblivious adversaries are not aware of the ex-
istence of the defense mechanism, and generate adversarial examples based on
the unsecured classification model. With this advancement in adversarial attacks
every year, various defenses have been proposed to counter them. Parseval net-
works [12] and Liplitchz Margin Training [44] train robust models by reducing
their Lipschitz constant. LAT [38], Feature denoising [48], and Feature Scatter-
ing [55] achieve robustness by harnessing the fact that latent layers can help
defend to perturbations. TRADES [56] presents a new defense method that pro-
vides a trade-off between adversarial robustness and accuracy by decomposing
the prediction error for adversarial examples (robust error) as the sum of the nat-
ural (classification) error and boundary error. Among the proposed approaches,
Adversarial Training (AT) [27,14,25,28] is a popular and widely opted strategy.
The objective of AT is to train models on adversarial examples at every step of
training to better match the adversarial distribution encountered at test time.
Qin et al. [35] show that AT techniques make the loss landscapes of networks
locally linear, and propose a regularizer that encourages the loss to behave lin-
early in the vicinity of the training data. A similar work [31] acts as a network
regularizer by directly minimizing curvature of their loss surface, leading to ad-
versarial robustness that is on par with adversarial training. Though AT is an
effective way of improving the robustness of deep networks, they are usually
computationally expensive. To address this drawback of AT, recent approaches
[37,54] aim to reduce adversarial training overhead by recycling gradients and
accelerating via the maximal principle respectively. For a comprehensive review
of the work done in the area of adversarial examples, please refer [51].
Mixup: Mixup [57] is a recent method that trains networks on convex combi-
nations of data pairs and their labels. By doing so, it regularizes the network
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to behave linearly in between training examples, thus inducing global linearity
between them. A recent variant, Manifold Mixup [46], exploits interpolations at
hidden representations, thereby obtaining neural networks with smoother deci-
sion boundaries at different levels of hidden representations. AugMix [19] mixes
up multiple augmented images and uses a Jensen-Shannon Divergence consis-
tency loss on them to achieve better robustness to common input corruptions
[18]. In semi-supervised learning, MixMatch [4] obtains state-of-the-art results by
guessing low-entropy labels for data-augmented unlabeled examples and mixes
labeled and unlabeled data using Mixup. It has been shown that apart from bet-
ter generalization, Mixup also improves the robustness of models to adversarial
perturbations but not as significantly as AT. To further boost this robustness at
inference time, Pang et al. [33] recently proposed a Mixup Inference technique
which performs a mixup of input x with a clean sample xs and passes the corre-
sponding mixup sample (λ·x+(1−λ)·xs) into the classifier as the processed input.
Their analysis indicates that MI imposes a tighter upper bound on the potential
attack ability for a crafted perturbation leading to robustness to adversarial at-
tacks. Other efforts on Mixup [42] have shown that Mixup-trained networks are
significantly better calibrated than ones trained in the regular fashion. These re-
cent efforts have shown the potential of Mixup-based methods, which we exploit
in the latent space for state-of-the-art robustness results.
Comparison with Other Mixup-related Work: Considering the recent pop-
ularity of Mixup-based methods, we address how our work is different from other
recent efforts in Mixup. Xu et al. [50] use domain mixup to improve the general-
ization ability of models in domain adaptation. Adversarial Mixup Resynthesis
[3] involves mixing latent codes used by autoencoders through an arbitrary mix-
ing mechanism that can recombine codes from different inputs to produce novel
examples. This work however has a different objective and focuses on generative
models in a GAN-like setting, while our work focuses on adversarial robustness,
which is a different objective. The work by Liu et al. [26] might be closest to
ours in terms of approach as they introduce the adversarial autoencoder (AAE)
to impose the feature representations with uniform distribution and apply the
linear interpolation on latent space. However, their work deals from a general-
ization perspective, and results show marginal improvements. In our work, we
directly exploit the manifold learned by VAE (and do not regularize it unlike
the previous work) for the mixup and report improved adversarial robustness.
Moreover, we also present useful insights into the working of VarMixup (leading
to robustness), which is lacking in earlier work including [26], thus making our
contributions different and more complete.
3 Methodology
3.1 Notations and Preliminaries
We denote a neural network as Fw : Rc×h×w → Rk, with weight parameters w.
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Fig. 2: Illustration of conceptual idea behind VarMixup. We
interpolate on the unfolded manifold, as defined by a gener-
ative model (VAE, in our case).
Fw takes an image
x ∈ Rc×h×w and
outputs logits, F iw(x)
for each class i ∈
{1...k}. Without loss
of generality, we as-
sume the classifica-
tion task, and L de-
notes the standard
cross-entropy loss func-
tion. pactual denotes
the training data dis-
tribution, and the op-
timal weight parame-
ter, w∗, obtained by
training the network
using standard empir-
ical risk minimization
is given by: w∗ = arg minw E(x,y)∼pactual [ L (Fw(x), y) ]. Here y is the true label
associated with input x. We now briefly introduce the concepts relevant to this
work, before describing our methodology.
Adversarial Attacks: In this work, we consider L∞ bounded Projected Gradi-
ent Descent Attack (PGD) [27] which is a more powerful, multi-step variant of
FGSM [14] attack, and commonly considered among the state-of-the-art adver-
sarial attacks. The adversary of input x is computed as follows:
x0 = x;xt+1 = Πx+S
(
xt + α sign(∇xL (Fw(x), y))
)
(1)
where α is the step size, Π is the projection function, and S is the space of
possible perturbations. For more details, we refer the interested reader to [27].
Adversarial Training (AT): This is used to train the model in a robust manner by
continuously augmenting the data with adversarial perturbations, to match the
training distribution with the adversarial test distribution [14,27]. Essentially,
for AT, the optimal parameter w∗ is given by:
w∗ = arg min
w
E(x,y)∼pactual
[
max
δ∈S
L (Fw(x+ δ), y)
]
(2)
Here, the inner maximization maxδ∈N L (Fw(x + δ), y) is calculated using a
strong adversarial attack such as PGD.
Mixup: [57] proposed a method to train models on the convex combination of
pairs of examples and their labels. In other words, it constructs virtual training
examples as: x′ = λ · xi + (1− λ) · xj ; y′ = λ · yi + (1− λ) · yj , where xi, xj are
input vectors; yi, yj are one-hot label encodings and λ is a mixup coefficient,
usually sampled from a β(η, η) distribution. Its variant, Manifold Mixup [46], a
more recent method, trains neural networks on linear combinations of hidden
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representations of training examples.
Mixup Inference: [33], a recently developed specialized inference principle for
mixup-trained models, attempts to break the locality of adversarial perturba-
tions. Assuming that Fw is a pre-trained mixup model, the output scores using
MI, FMIw (x), on an input x is given by:
FMIw (x) = Exs∼pMIFw(λMI · x+ (1− λMI) · xs) (3)
Here, λMI ∈ [0, 1] is a fixed mixup coefficient and pMI is known as a sampling
pool which differs for different variants of MI. In this work, we consider MI-
OL (MI with other labels), where the sampling pool pMI contains examples
uniformly belonging to all classes except the predicted class of x. The expectation
can be approximated by averaging over NMI runs.
3.2 Background: Vicinal Risk Minimization
Given the data distribution pactual, a neural network Fw and loss function L,
the expected risk (average of loss function over pactual) is given by R(Fw) =∫ L(Fw(x), y)·dpactual(x, y). In practice, the true distribution pactual is unknown,
and is approximated by the training dataset D = {(xi, yi)}Ni=1, which represents
the empirical distribution: pδ(x, y) =
1
N ·
∑N
i=1 δ(x = xi, y = yi). Here, δ(x =
xi, y = yi) is the Dirac delta function centered at (xi, yi). Using pδ as an estimate
to pactual, we define expected empirical risk as:
Rδ(Fw) =
1
N
·
N∑
i=1
L(Fw(xi), yi) (4)
Minimizing Eqn 4 to find optimal Fw∗ is typically termed Empirical Risk Min-
imization (ERM). However overparametrized neural networks can suffer from
memorizing, leading to undesirable behavior of network outside the training dis-
tribution, pδ. Addressing this concern, Chapelle et al. proposed Vicinal Risk
Minimization (VRM), where pactual is approximated by a vicinal distribution
pv, given by:
pv(x, y) =
1
N
·
N∑
i=1
v(x, y|xi, yi) (5)
where v is the vicinal distribution that calculates the probability of a data point
(x, y) in the vicinity of other samples (xi, yi). Thus, using pv to approximate
pactual, expected vicinal risk is given by:
Rv(Fw) =
1
N
·
N∑
i=1
g(Fw,L, xi, yi) (6)
where g(Fw,L, xi, yi) =
∫ L(Fw(x), y)·dv(x, y|xi, yi). Popular examples of vicinal
distributions include: (i) Gaussian Vicinal distribution: Here, vgaussian(x, y|xi, yi) =
N (x−xi, σ2) · δ(y = yi), which is equivalent to augmenting the training samples
with Gaussian noise; and (ii) Mixup Vicinal distribution : Here vmixup(x, y|xi, yi) =
1
n ·
∑N
j=1 Eλ[δ(x = λ ·xi + (1−λ) ·xj , y = λ · yi + (1−λ) · yj)], where λ ∼ β(η, η)
and η > 0.
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From a perspective of adversarial robustness, analogous to previous defini-
tions, we define adversarial risk in this work as:
Radv(Fw) =
∫
max
δ∈S
L(Fw(x+ δ), y) · dpactual(x, y)
Radvδ (Fw) =
1
N
·
N∑
i=1
max
δ∈S
L(Fw(xi + δ), yi)
Radvv (Fw) =
1
N
·
N∑
i=1
max
δ∈S
g(Fw,L, xi + δ, yi)
(7)
where S is the space of allowed perturbations.
Let F vw∗ be the solution of minimization of vicinal adversarial risk, R
adv
v (Fw).
Then, following (cf. Eqn 11 in) [52], the quantity Radv(F vw∗)−Radvv (F vw∗) corre-
sponds to the estimation of the expected adversarial risk of F vw∗ from its vicinal
adversarial risk, and this can be bounded as:
Radv(F vw∗)−Radvv (F vw∗) ≤ sup
Fw
{Radv(Fw)−Radvv (Fw)} (8)
which we call the robustness bound for VRM. Note again that this bound is anal-
ogous to the generalization bound for VRM in [52]. Motivated by this bound, we
propose an approach to leverage the vicinal distribution to achieve adversarial
robustness. From Eqn 8, we observe that the bound depends on two factors:
(1) the choice of vicinal distribution v and (2) the choice of family neural net-
works Fw. In this work, we limit the choice of Fw to ResNets [17] (specifically
ResNet-34), thereby restricting the function class, and study the choice of vicinal
distribution. Considering the recent success of using Mixup as a vicinal distribu-
tion for generalization [57] and Mixup inference for state-of-the-art adversarial
robustness [33], we choose to consider a vicinal distribution based on Mixup-
based linear interpolations. However, we propose the use of vicinal distributions
from latent spaces in this work. We explain this choice below.
The use of generative models such as Variational Autoencoders (VAEs) [23]
to capture the latent space from which a distribution is generated provides us
an unfolded manifold (the low-dimensional latent space), where the linearity
in between training examples is more readily observed. Defining vicinal dis-
tributions by using neighbours on this latent manifold (which is linear in the
low-dimensional space) learned by generative models hence provides us more
effective linear interpolations than the ones in input space. We use a generative
model to capture the induced global linearity in between examples on a latent
manifold, and define mixup vicinal distributions on this latent surface.
3.3 Our Approach: VarMixup (Variational Mixup)
To capture the latent manifold of the training data through a generative model,
we opt for a Variational Autoencoder (VAE). VAE [23] is an autoencoder which
is trained using Variational Inference, which serves as an implicit regularizer to
ensure that the obtained latent space allows us to generate new data from the
same distribution as training data.
8 P. Mangla et al.
We denote the encoding and decoding distribution of VAE as qφ(z|x) and
pθ(x|z) respectively, parameterized by φ and θ respectively. Given p(z) as the
desired prior distribution for encoding, the general VAE objective is given by
the loss function:
LV AE = −γ ·D(qφ(z)‖p(z)) + Ex∼pactualEz∼qφ(z|x)[log(pθ(x|z))] (9)
Here, D is any strict divergence, meaning that D(q‖p) ≥ 0 and D(q‖p) = 0 if
and only if q = p, and γ > 0 is a scaling coefficient. The second term in the
objective act as a image resconstruction loss and qφ(z) = Ex∼pactual [qφ(z|x)].
The original VAE [23] uses KL-divergence in Eqn 9, and thus optimizes the
objective:
LV AE = −γEx∼p[KL(qφ(z|x)‖p(z))] + Ex∼pEz∼qφ(z|x)[log(pθ(x|z))] (10)
where p is pactual. However, using KL-divergence in Eqn 9 has some shortcom-
ings. As pointed out by [10,39,58], the KL-divergence in Eqn 10 can be restrictive
[11,40,6] as it encourages the encoding qφ(z|x) to be a random sample from p(z)
for each x, making them uninformative about the input. Also, it is not strong
enough a regularizer compared to the reconstruction loss and tends to overfit
data, consequently, learning a qφ(z|x) that has high variance. Both the afore-
mentioned shortcomings can affect the encoding distribution by making them
uninformative of inputs with high variance. Since we use VAEs to better cap-
ture a linear latent manifold and subsequently define interpolations there, a bad
latent distribution can affect our method significantly. We hence use a variant
Maximum Mean Discrepancy VAE (MMD-VAE)[58] which uses a MMD Loss
[15] instead of KL-divergence, and hence optimizes the objective:
LMMD−V AE = γ ·MMD(qφ(z)‖p(z)) +Ex∼pactualEz∼qφ(z|x)[log(pθ(x|z))] (11)
A MMD-VAE doesn’t suffer from the aforementioned shortcomings [58], as it
maximizes mutual information between x and z by matching the distribution
over encodings qφ(z) with prior p(z) only in expectation, rather than for every
input. We hence train an MMD-VAE to characterize the training distribution
more effectively. We now define a Mixup vicinal distribution in the latent space
of the trained VAE as:
vV arMixup(z, y|xi, yi) = 1
n
·
N∑
j=1
Eλ[δ(z = λ · Ez[qφ(z|xi)] + (1− λ) · Ez[qφ(z|xj)],
y = λ · yi + (1− λ) · yj)]
(12)
where λ ∼ β(η, η) and η > 0. Using the above vicinal distribution, vV arMixup
and the MMD-VAE decoder, pθ(x|z), we construct VarMixup samples as:
x′ = Ex[pθ(x|λ · Ez[qφ(z|xi)] + (1− λ) · Ez[qφ(z|xj)])]
y′ = λ · yi + (1− λ) · yj
From another perspective, one could view our new sampling technique as per-
forming Manifold Mixup [46], however over the latent space of an MMD-VAE
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(instead of the neural network feature space) and using it for sample reconstruc-
tion. (We compare against Manifold Mixup in our results.) Figure 2 illustrates
the conceptual idea behind VarMixup.
Analogous to the empirical distribution, pδ used in Eqn 4, we also define
a (non-vicinal) Empirical Risk Minimization, defined using the VAE, which we
call VarERM, and is given by:
pV arERM (z, y) =
1
N
·
N∑
i=1
δ(z = Ez[qφ(z|xi)], y = yi) (13)
and use the MMD-VAE decoder, pθ(x|z) to construct samples which are close
to the original distribution. We use this for comparisons in our experiments.
Additionally, it is easy to observe that our VarMixup sampling can also be
integrated with Mixup-Inference which is given by:
FMIw (x) = Exs∼ρMIFw(Ex[pθ(x|λMI · Ez[qφ(z|x)] + (1− λMI) · Ez[qφ(z|xs)])])
(14)
We call this modified Mixup-Inference as VarMI (Variational Mixup Inference)
in our experiments and show that under oblivious attacks, VarMixup and VarMI
together performs significantly better than regular Mixup + MI and other ad-
versarial training baselines.
4 Experiments and Results
We now present our experimental studies and results using our method, VarMixup,
on multiple datasets. We begin by describing the datasets, evaluation criteria and
implementation details.
Datasets:We perform experiments on four well-known standard datasets: CIFAR-
10, CIFAR-100 [24], SVHN [32] and Tiny-ImageNet [13]. Descriptions of these
standard datasets are deferred to the Supplementary section. CIFAR-10 is a
subset of 80 million tiny images dataset and consists of 60,000 32× 32 color im-
ages containing one of 10 object classes, with 6000 images per class. CIFAR-100
is just like CIFAR-10, except that it has 100 classes containing 600 images each.
There are 500 training images and 100 testing images per class. SVHN is ob-
tained from house numbers in Google Street View images. It consists of 32× 32
color images belonging to 10 classes with 73257 digits for training and 26032
digits for testing. Tiny-Imagenet has 200 classes, with each class containing 500
training images, 50 validation images, and 50 test images. Each image here is of
resolution 64× 64.
Evaluation Criteria: Analogous to Mixup Inference [33], we evaluate trained
models under the oblivious setting [9] where the adversary is not aware of the
existence of the defense mechanism (e.g. MI, VarMI), and generates adversarial
examples based on the classification model. We follow recent papers [33,38,25,31]
and use a 10-step untargeted PGD [27] attack with step-size α = 8255 and l∞
perturbation  = 8255 across all datasets. We also report accuracy on clean images
and standard deviations over 10 trials. We evaluate the robustness of our trained
models on the newer CIFAR-10-C, CIFAR-100-C and Tiny-Imagenet-C datasets
[18] too. These datasets contain images, corrupted with 15 different distortions
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at 5 severity levels. Additionaly, We also perform evaluation under white-box
adaptive setting [2] analogous to Mixup-Inference. In section 5, we also evaluate
our models on targeted, stronger PGD and gradient-free attacks to confirm the
absence of gradient masking or obfuscation [7,2].
Implementation Details: It has been shown [22] that training a network ad-
versarially removes irrelevant biases (e.g. texture biases) in their hidden rep-
resentations, thus making them more informative. We hence hypothesize that
the considered VAE, if trained adversarially, will have more informative latent
encoding than its regular equivalent. This would hence help improve the em-
pirical/vicinal distributions like VarMixup, VarERM and VarMI. Empirically,
we validate this hypothesis in our subsequent experiments and use prefix adv-
(eg: adv -VarMixup) to distinguish them from their regular variants. We stress
that the aforementioned approach should not be confused with training a model
adversarially using VarMixup (we only train the VAE adversarially). We also
train a model adversarially using VarMixup, but discuss these results in the
Supplementary section to avoid overcrowding of results and space constraints.
Table 1 summarizes the variants of our approach that we consider with their
corresponding abbreviations, which we used in subsequent sections. All models
are trained on Resnet-34 [17] backbone across all datasets. A study on varying
hyper-parameters is presented in Section 5.
Table 1: Variants of our approach and their implementation details. reg - regular, adv-
adversarial, MI- Mixup Inference
VAE Method MI Abbreviation Details
reg.
ERM No
VarERM Variational ERM (Eqn 13), Adam
Optimizer ( lr = 1e− 3), 100 epochsadv. adv -VarERM
reg.
ERM Yes
VarERM + VarMI Inference using Variational MI (Eqn 14),
λMI = 0.5 and NMI = 30.adv. adv -VarERM + adv -VarMI
reg.
Mixup No
VarMixup VarMixup (Eqn 12), Adam Optimizer ( lr = 1e− 3),
150 epochs, Mixup coefficient sampled from β(1, 1)adv. adv -VarMixup
reg.
Mixup Yes
VarMixup + VarMI Inference using Variational MI (Eqn 14),
λMI = 0.5 and NMI = 30.adv. adv -VarMixup + adv -VarMI
Baseline Models: We compare our methods against an exhaustive set of base-
lines including non-VRM variants, mixup variants and state-of-the-art adversar-
ial techniques. Below are their details:
1. ERM - Vanilla Empirical Risk Minimization (Eqn 4) using Adam optimizer
(lr = 1e− 3) for 100 epochs on all datasets.
2. ERM + MI - Using Mixup-Inference [33] (MI-OL) on ERM with λMI = 0.5
and NMI = 30.
3. Mixup - Vanilla Mixup training [57] using Adam optimizer (lr = 1e− 3) for
150 epochs on all datasets. Mixup coefficient is sampled from β(1, 1).
4. Mixup + MI - Using Mixup-Inference [33] (MI-OL) on Mixup with λMI = 0.5
and NMI = 30.
5. AT and TRADES - l∞ PGD/TRADES adversarial training [27,56] with
 = 8/255 and step-size α = 2/255. Models are trained using Adam optimizer
(lr = 1e− 3) for 250 epochs on all datasets.
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6. IAT - l∞ Interpolated adversarial training [25] with  = 8/255 and step-
size α = 2/255. Interpolation coefficient is sampled from β(1, 1). Models are
trained using Adam optimizer (lr = 1e− 3) for 350 epochs on all datasets.
7. IAT + MI - Using Mixup-Inference [33] (MI-OL) on IAT with λMI = 0.6
and NMI = 30.
8. LAT, LLR and CURE - Adversarial training methods: Latent adversarial
training [38], Local-Linear Regularization [35] and Curvature regularization
[31] reported from original papers.
Robustness on CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, SVHN and Tiny-Imagenet: We
first evaluate the robustness and report our results in Table 2. As can be seen,
without any adversarial training VarMixup + VarMI outperforms state-of-the-
art adversarial training techniques by a significant margin (∼ 5% over IAT +
MI and ∼ 10 − 12% over other AT techniques). Also, it can be noticed that
the adversarial variant of our approach - adv -VarMixup + adv -VarMI performs
better across all datasets.
Transferability from Tiny-Imagenet to CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100: The
proposed methodology will be more scalable and time-efficient, if a VAE trained
on a dataset such as ImageNet can be used to generate VarMixup samples for
other datasets. This is a typical transfer learning setting, and we study the per-
formance of training VarMixup models on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 datasets
using MMD-VAE trained on the Tiny-Imagenet dataset. We report our find-
ings in Table 3. It can be seen that our approaches - VarMixup + VarMI/
adv-VarMixup + adv-VarMI still manage to outperform all adversarial training
baselines (which are trained directly on the target dataset) by a good margin
(∼ 1− 2% over IAT+MI and ∼ 10− 15% over other AT techniques).
Robustness to common input corruptions: Apart from adversarial pertur-
bations, we also evaluate the trained models on various common input corrup-
tions. Hendrycks et al. [18] recently proposed newer CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100 and
Tiny-Imagenet test datasets (CIFAR-10-C, CIFAR-100-C, and Tiny-Imagenet-
C) containing images corrupted with 15 different distortions (Gaussian blur,
Shot Noise, Impulse Noise, JPEG compression, Motion blur, frost, etc.) and 5
levels of severity. We report the mean classification accuracy over all distortions
on CIFAR-10-C, CIFAR-100-C and Tiny-Imagenet-C datasets in Table 4. From
the table, our method - VarMixup/adv -VarMixup achieves superior performance
by a margin of ∼ 2 − 4%. It is also interesting to note that other variants like
VarERM/adv -VarERM also perform significantly better than vanilla ERM and
many adversarial training techniques, highlighting our method’s effectiveness.
Comparison with Manifold Mixup: As stated in Section 3, one could view
our method as performing Manifold Mixup in a latent space. It has been stated
[46] that models trained using Manifold Mixup are not robust to strong adversar-
ial attacks like PGD [27]. However, for completeness and fairness, we study the
performance of the two approaches. We obtain 2.24% and 9.48% accuracy against
a 10-step PGD attack (used in Table 2) using Manifold-Mixup and Manifold-
Mixup + MI on the CIFAR-10 dataset. For CIFAR-100, the corresponding ac-
curacies are 1.87% and 5.94% on Manifold-Mixup and Manifold-Mixup + MI
respectively. For SVHN, Manifold mixup achieves adversarial accuracy 26.5%
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Table 2: Robustness against PGD attack on CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, SVHN and Tiny-
Imagenet datasets. Best results in bold and second best underlined. ’-’ denotes no
implementation or results available. Original (clean) accuracy of each model (w/o ad-
versarial perturbations) reported in parentheses.
Method PGD10 (Clean)
CIFAR-10 CIFAR-100
AT [27] 47.34 ± 0.32 (85.58 ± 0.14) 22.72 ± 0.37 (60.28 ± 0.13)
LAT [38] 53.84 (87.80) 27.03 (60.94)
IAT [25] 40.0 ± 0.57 (89.7 ± 0.33) 20.6 ± 0.49 (62.7 ± 0.21)
TRADES [56] 51.65 ± 0.32 (88.11 ± 0.43) 25.5 ± 0.35(63.3 ± 0.32)
LLR [35] 54.95 (86.83) -
CURE [31] 47.69 (84.45) -
IAT + MI [33] 61.57 ± 1.30 (84.2 ± 1.26) 30.85 ± 1.04 ( 61.4 ± 1.15)
ERM 0.0 ± 0.0 (94.5 ± 0.14) 0.0 ± 0.01 (64.5 ± 0.10)
VarERM 0.27 ± 0.07 (90.22 ± 0.43) 0.7 ± 0.04 (63.28 ± 0.46)
adv -VarERM 1.01 ± 0.02 (88.47 ± 0.39) 0.56 ± 0.05 (62.74 ± 0.26)
Mixup [57] 7.5 ± 0.32 (95.5 ± 0.35 ) 0.36 ± 0.12 (76.8 ± 0.41)
VarMixup 12.34 ± 0.37 (91.91 ± 0.45 ) 0.72 ± 0.12 (67.2 ± 0.44 )
adv -VarMixup 17.66 ± 0.23 (89.19 ± 0.32 ) 0.74 ± 0.19 (67.13 ± 0.34)
ERM + MI 12.4 ± 1.02 (60.23 ± 0.97) 2.4 ± 1.11 (35.46 ± 0.92)
VarERM + VarMI 30.49 ± 1.03 (56.38 ± 1.0) 12.04 ± 0.98 (33.88 ± 1.10)
adv -VarERM + adv -VarMI 38.13 ± 1.09 (53.30 ± 0.95) 11.45 ± 1.01 (31.79 ± 1.20 )
Mixup + MI [33] 25.76 ± 1.12 (86.84 ± 1.05) 6.71 ± 1.03 (67.8 ± 1.06 )
VarMixup + VarMI 66.84 ± 1.08 (82.15 ± 0.92) 35.8 ± 1.24 (63.5 ± 1.34)
adv -VarMixup + adv -VarMI 68.66 ± 1.21 (82.06 ± 1.19) 40.13 ± 1.2 (63.98 ± 1.32)
Method PGD10 (Clean)
SVHN Tiny-Imagenet
AT [27] 54.58 ± 0.53 (91.88 ± 0.34) 3.78 ± 0.21 (22.33 ± 0.16)
LAT [38] 60.23 (91.65) -
IAT [25] 54.83 ± 0.67 (93.41 ± 0.47) 12.13 ±0.18 (51.94 ± 0.28)
TRADES [56] - 3.83 ± 0.12 (26.12 ± 0.38)
CURE [31] 32.43 ± 0.02 (79.28 ± 0.01) -
IAT + MI [33] 60.0 ± 1.09 (80.0 ± 1.34) 12.1 ± 0.24 (18.08 ± 0.34 )
ERM 0.45 ± 0.11 (95.47 ± 0.56) 0.0 ± 0.0 (49.96 ± 0.12)
VarERM 0.67 ± 0.23 (95.60 ± 0.55) 0.1 ± 0.03 (46.35 ± 0.36)
adv -VarERM 0.17 ± 0.08 (95.10 ± 0.56) 0.04 ± 0.01 (43.87 ± 0.27)
Mixup 4.28 ± 0.52 (96.54 ± 0.49) 0.0 ± 0.0 (53.83 ± 0.17)
VarMixup 2.59 ± 0.50 (96.72 ± 0.48) 0.01 ± 0.01 (46.98 ± 0.11)
adv -VarMixup 3.38 ± 0.53 (95.64 ± 0.50) 0.0 ± 0.0 (46.58 ± 0.23)
ERM + MI 37.00 ± 0.98 (71.85 ± 1.21) 1.54 ± 0.05 (25.56 ± 0.83)
VarERM + VarMI 38.25 ± 0.99 (66.93 ± 1.20) 5.8 ± 0.14 (23.61 ± 0.72)
adv -VarERM + adv -VarMI 53.81 ± 1.05 (69.78 ± 1.29) 7.27 ± 0.19 (25.73 ± 0.77)
Mixup + MI 37.05 ± 1.30 (89.97 ± 1.34) 2.93 ± 0.5 (47.2 ± 0.23)
VarMixup + VarMI 78.08 ± 1.05 (88.45 ± 1.11) 12.75 ± 0.42 (42.88 ± 0.15)
adv -VarMixup + adv -VarMI 87.20 ± 1.09 (88.40 ± 1.12) 19.9 ± 0.53 (44.18 ± 0.24)
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Table 3: Transferablity results on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100. Best results in bold
and second best underlined. ’-’ denotes no implementation or results available. Original
clean accuracy reported in parentheses.
Method PGD10 (Clean)
CIFAR-10 CIFAR-100
AT [27] 47.34 ± 0.32 (85.58 ± 0.14) 22.72 ± 0.37 (60.28 ± 0.13)
LAT [38] 53.84 (87.80) 27.03 (60.94)
IAT [25] 40.0 ± 0.57 (89.7 ± 0.33) 20.6 ± 0.49 (62.7 ± 0.21)
TRADES [56] 51.65 ± 0.32 (88.11 ± 0.43) 25.5 ± 0.35(63.3 ± 0.32)
LLR [35] 54.95 (86.83) -
CURE [31] 47.69 (84.45) -
IAT + MI [33] 61.57 ± 1.30 (84.2 ± 1.26) 30.85 ± 1.04 (61.4 ± 1.15)
ERM 0.0 ± 0.0 (94.5 ± 0.14) 0.0 ± 0.01 (64.5 ± 0.10)
VarERM 0.12 ± 0.01 (90.34 ± 0.23 ) 0.54 ± 0.05 (63.4 ± 0.33 )
adv -VarERM 0.37 ± 0.19 (89.89 ± 0.12) 0.66 ± 0.04 (62.08 ± 0.17)
Mixup 7.5 ± 0.32 (95.5 ± 0.35 ) 0.36 ± 0.12 (76.8 ± 0.41)
VarMixup 10.21 ± 0.34 (91.09 ± 0.21) 0.82 ± 0.14 (67.7 ± 0.27)
adv -VarMixup 8.33 ± 0.11 (90.71 ± 0.31) 0.44 ± 0.09 (65.48 ± 0.43)
ERM + MI 12.4 ± 1.02 (60.23 ± 0.97) 2.4 ± 1.11 (35.46 ± 0.92)
VarERM + VarMI 24.46 ± 1.23 (52.12 ± 1.01) 12.0 ± 1.09 (34.84 ± 0.98)
adv -VarERM + adv -VarMI 31.96 ± 1.1 (58.94 ± 0.96 ) 13.02 ± 1.13 (33.04 ± 0.92)
MT + MI 25.76 ± 1.12 (86.84 ± 1.05) 6.71 ± 1.03 (67.8 ± 1.06 )
VarMixup + VarMI 62.26 ± 1.11 (82.48 ± 1.12) 30.3 ± 1.03 (60.03 ± 0.99)
adv -VarMixup + adv -VarMI 63.41 ± 1.20 (82.76 ± 1.02) 31.3 ± 1.15 (60.74 ± 0.95)
and 11.55% with and without MI. For Tiny Imagenet, the accuracies are 2.99%
and 0.07% for Manifold Mixup with and without MI respectively. As can be
compared from Table 2, VarMixup + MI performs superior to Manifold Mixup.
We defer analogous results on SVHN and Tiny-Imagenet datasets to the Sup-
plementary material due to space constraints. Our results show that the use of
the latent unfolded manifold is indeed better than using hidden layer represen-
tations.
Performance under White-box Adaptive Attacks: Following Athalye et
al. [2] and analogous to Mixup-Inference [33], we design adaptive white-box at-
tacks for VarMI. From Eqn 14, VarMI is given as:
FV arMIw (x) = EρMIFw(Ex[pθ(x|λMI · Ez[qφ(z|x)] + (1− λMI) · Ez[qφ(z|xs)])])
Let
u = Ex[pθ(x|λMI · Ez[qφ(z|x)] + (1− λMI) · Ez[qφ(z|xs)])]
and
v = λMI · Ez[qφ(z|x)] + (1− λMI) · Ez[qφ(z|xs)]
Then, the gradient of VarMI prediction w.r.t. input x is given as (here, λMI is
fixed throughout inference):
∂FV arMIw (x)
∂x
= EρMI
∂Fw(u)
∂x
= EρMI
∂Fw(u)
∂u
· ∂u
∂x
= EρMI
∂Fw(u)
∂u
· ∂u
∂v
· ∂v
∂x
= λMI · EρMI ·
∂Fw(u)
∂u
· ∂u
∂v
· Ez ∂qφ(z|x)
∂x
(15)
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Now, according to Eqn 15 above, the sign of gradients used in adaptive PGD
can be approximated by:
sign
(
∂FV arMIw (x)
∂x
)
= sign
( NA∑
i=1
∂Fw(u)
∂u
· ∂u
∂v
· Ez ∂qφ(z|x)
∂x
)
(16)
Here, the number of adaptive samples, NA, refers to the execution times of
sampling xs in each iteration step of adaptive PGD to approximate the above
equation. Figure 3 shows the performance of Mixup/VarMixup/adv -VarMixup
under adaptive PGD attacks on CIFAR-10/-100. As can be seen, our proposed
inference VarMI along with VarMixup performs better than regular Mixup and
Mixup-Inference.
Table 4: Robustness to common input corruptions on CIFAR-10-C, CIFAR-100-C and
Tiny-Imagenet-C [18] datasets. Best results in bold and second best underlined.
Method CIFAR-10-C CIFAR-100-C Tiny-Imagenet-C
AT [27] 73.12 ± 0.31 45.09 ± 0.31 15.74 ± 0.36
TRADES [27] 75.46 ± 0.21 45.98 ± 0.41 16.20 ± 0.23
IAT [25] 81.05 ± 0.42 50.71 ± 0.25 18.69 ± 0.45
ERM 69.29 ± 0.21 47.3 ± 0.32 17.34 ± 0.27
VarERM 79.66 ± 0.12 49.26 ± 0.31 20.18 ± 0.11
adv -VarERM 79.73 ± 0.13 50.49 ± 0.26 21.62 ± 0.09
MT 74.74 ± 0.34 52.13 ± 0.43 21.55 ± 0.37
VarMixup 82.57 ± 0.42 52.57 ± 0.39 24.87 ± 0.32
adv -VarMixup 82.12 ± 0.46 54.0 ± 0.41 25.36 ± 0.21
Fig. 3: Performance under 10-step adaptive PGD attacks ( = 8/255) on CIFAR-
10 and CIFAR-100.
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5 Discussion and Ablation studies
In this section, we conduct ablations to empirically characterize and analyze the
efficacy of the proposed method.
Local linearity on loss landscapes: It has been shown [35] that local linearity
of loss landscapes of neural networks is related to model robustness. The more
the loss landscapes are linear, the more the adversarial robustness. To this fact,
we analyze the local linearity of loss landscapes of VarMixup and regular mixup
trained models. Qin et al. [35] defines local linearity at a data-point x within a
neighbourhood B() as: γ(, x, y) = maxδ∈B() |L(Fw(x+ δ), y)− L(Fw(x), y)−
δTOxL(Fw(x), y)|. Figure 4 shows the average local linear error (over test set)
with increasing L∞ max-perturbation  on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 datasets.
As can be seen, VarMixup/adv -VarMixup makes the local linear error signifi-
cantly (× 2) lesser as compared to regular mixup, thus inducing robustness. This
robustness gets further boosted by using VarMI at inference stage.
Fig. 4: Local linear error of loss landscapes
of models trained on CIFAR-10/-100
Analyzing VarMixup samples:
Figure 7 shows sample data gener-
ated by regular Mixup, VarMixup,
and adv -VarMixup on two images.
We observe that though mixup or
VarMixup samples look perceptually
similar, they are quite different at sta-
tistical level. We measure the Frechet
Inception Distance (FID) [20] and
Kernel Inception Distance [5] between
regular training data and training data generated by mixup/VarMixup/ adv -
VarMixup. These scores summarize how similar the two groups are in terms of
statistics on computer vision features of the raw images calculated using the
Inceptionv3 model used for image classification. Lower scores indicate the two
groups of images are more similar, or have more similar statistics, with a perfect
score being 0.0 indicating that the two groups of images are identical. Figure
5 reports these metrics on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 respectively. The greater
FID and KID scores indicate that we are adding off-manifold samples (manifold
characterized by training data) to the training using our approach.
Calibration error: A recent study [42] showed that DNNs trained with Mixup
are significantly better calibrated than DNNs trained in a regular fashion. Cali-
bration [16] measures how good softmax scores are as indicators of the actual like-
lihood of a correct prediction. We measure the Expected Calibration Error(ECE)
[42,16] of our trained networks, following [42]: predictions (total N predictions)
are grouped into M interval bins (Bm) of equal size. The accuracy and confidence
of Bm are defined as:
acc(Bm) =
1
|Bm|
∑
i∈Bm
1 · (yˆi = yi)
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and
conf(Bm) =
1
|Bm|
∑
i∈Bm
pˆi
where pˆi, yˆi, yi are the confidence, predicted label and true label of sample i
respectively. The Expected Calibration Error(ECE) is then defined as:
ECE =
M∑
m=1
|Bm|
N
· | acc(Bm)− conf(Bm) |
.
Models trained on CIFAR-10 with VarMixup and adv -VarMixup have ECE of
0.105 and 0.07 respectively whereas, model trained using regular mixup has ECE
0.13. On CIFAR-100 the ECEs are 0.135, 0.127 and 0.122 for Mixup, VarMixup
and adv -VarMixup models respectively. This indicates that our VarMixup mod-
els are better calibrated than regular Mixup.
Fig. 5: FID and KID scores between train-
ing set and mixup/VarMixup generated
samples on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100
VarMixup on Interpolated Ad-
versarial Training: We also inte-
grate VarMixup with the more re-
cent Interpolated Adversarial Train-
ing (IAT) [25], and call it VarIAT.
On CIFAR-10, VarIAT and VarIAT+VarMI
achieve adversarial robustness of
49.37% and 71.7%, respectively. For
SVHN, the adversarial accuracies are
21.07% and 81.18% for VarIAT and
VarIAT+VarMI, respectively. As can
be seen from Table 2 (main sub-
mission), under oblivious settings,
VarIAT (VarIAT + VarMI) achieves superior performance to IAT (IAT + MI)
in most scenarios. The evaluations were carried out in the same setting as Table
2.
Robustness to stronger, targeted and gradient-free attacks: we also
evaluate our models on a stronger 50-step PGD attack [27] (PGD50), targeted
10-step PGD attacks (t-PGD10) and Gradient free SPSA [45] attack. We use
 = 8/255 for all attacks. For targeted attacks, we chose the second most likely
class as target class. SPSA results are evaluated over 1000 test samples. We
report our results in Table 5. As can be seen, our methods VarMixup + VarMI
outperforms the rest in most scenarios. The results also confirm the absence of
any gradient masking and obfuscation [7,2] in our training method.
Hyperparameter variations: We vary the beta distribution β(η, η) (used
to sample Mixup coefficient) parameter - η and train models using mixup,
VarMixup and adv -VarMixup and plot their adversarial accuracies in Figure
6. Figure 6 shows the variation of adversarial accuracy when λMI is varied from
0 to 1 in MI or VarMI. Both figures show that our VarMixup trained models
perform better irrespective of hyperparameters in most cases.
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Table 5: Robustness against stronger PGD, targeted and SPSA attacks [45] on CIFAR-
10 and CIFAR-100 datasets. Best results in bold and second best underlined.
Method CIFAR-10 CIFAR-100
PGD50 t-PGD10 SPSA PGD50 t-PGD10 SPSA
MT + MI [33] 11.29 48.28 69.28 3.61 31.83 46.42
VarMixup + VarMI 65.11 77.59 76.34 35.14 53.32 60.32
adv -VarMixup + adv -VarMI 67.34 75.29 72.66 40.01 54.81 61.02
AT [27] 46.4 49.49 79.68 21.56 34.56 53.60
IAT [25] 34.04 49.04 84.41 18.08 28.2 59.82
TRADES [56] 50.24 50.01 81.07 34.78 33.6 48.65
IAT + MI [33] 60.84 68.70 76.06 29.5 36.52 45.3
Fig. 6: (a) Varying η in β(η, η) distri-
bution from where mixup coefficient
is sampled, (b) Variation of hyper-
parameter λMI in MI or VarMI.
Computational Overhead:We compares
the computational time of our trained mod-
els using VarMixup/adv -VarMixup with
AT and TRADES adversarial training
techniques. VarMixup, adv -VarMixup, AT
and TRADES take around 3, 5, 8.8
and 15 hours respectively. We consid-
ered the MMD-VAE training time too
in these results. In addition, the trans-
ferability of a VAE trained on one
dataset to do VarMixup on another makes
our approach time-efficient and scalable.
6 Conclusions
Fig. 7: Samples generated by
mixup, VarMixup and adv -
VarMixup on CIFAR-10 (Mixup
coefficient λ = 0.5).
In this work, we propose a Mixup vicinal dis-
tribution, VarMixup, which performs linear
interpolations on an unfolded latent manifold
where linearity in between training examples
is likely to be preserved by construction. Anal-
ogous to Mixup Inference, we also define Vari-
ational Mixup Inference (VarMI) which when
combined with VarMixup trained models pro-
vides significant gains in adversarial robust-
ness over regular Mixup, Mixup Inference,
and state-of-the-art adversarial training tech-
niques under oblivious attacks. We also show
that VarMixup trained models are more ro-
bust to common input corruptions, are better
calibrated and have significantly lower local-
linear loss than regular mixup models. Additionally, our experiments indicate
that VarMixup adds more off-manifold images to training than regular mixup,
which we believe is the primary reason for observed robustness. Our work high-
lights the efficacy of defining vicinal distributions by using neighbors on unfolded
latent manifold rather than data manifold and we believe that our work can open
a discussion around this notion of robustness and choice of vicinal distributions.
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